

JPRS 69276

17 June 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1402

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

20000218 102

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 69276	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.	
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE - POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1402			5. Report Date 17 June 1977		
7. Author(s)			6.		
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.		
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.		
			11. Contract/Grant No.		
15. Supplementary Notes			13. Type of Report & Period Covered		
			14.		
16. Abstracts The serial report contains articles on official party and government pronouncements and writings on significant domestic political developments; information on general sociological problems and developments in such areas as demography, manpower, public health and welfare, education, and mass organizations; and articles on military and civil defense, organization, theory, budgets, and hardware.					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> International Affairs <input type="checkbox"/> Albania <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bulgaria <input type="checkbox"/> Czechoslovakia <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> East Germany <input type="checkbox"/> Hungary <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Poland <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Romania <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yugoslavia		Propaganda Political Science Sociology Military Organizations			
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5K, 15					
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151			19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 64
			20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price A04

17 June 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1402

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- GDR's Krolikowski Interviewed on GDR-Polish Relations
(Herbert Krolikowski Interview; East Berlin
Domestic Service, 27 May 77)..... 1

BULGARIA

- Organizations Subordinated to Committee of Art and
Culture
(DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, 5 Apr 77)..... 4

EAST GERMANY

- 'NEUES DEUTSCHLAND' Comments on Tito's Birthday
Anniversary
(Guenter Heyden; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25 May 77)..... 12
- Briefs
Greetings to Jordan 17

POLAND

- Warsaw Journal Comments on Polish-FRG Relations
(PAP, 29 May 77)..... 18
- Briefs
London Prints Censored Items 20

ROMANIA

- Change in Decree on Taxing of Non-Residents' Income
(BULETINUL OFICIAL, 20 May 77)..... 21

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Romanian-Mongolian Communique Issued on Dugersuren Visit (SCINTEIA, 2 Jun 77).....	23
Romanian Comment on Belgrade Conference of Journalists (Eugeniu Obrea; LUMEA, 5 May 77).....	26
Briefs Toma Appointment	30

YUGOSLAVIA

Peacetime Command/Staff Planning Outlined (Nikola Cubra; VOJNOEKONOMSKI PREGLED, Jan-Feb 77).....	31
Milovan Djilas Discusses European Situation on Eve of Belgrade Conference (DIE WELT, 21/22 May 77).....	47
General Ljubicic Views Shape of Future Warfare (Nikole Ljubicic; MORNARICKI GLASNIK, Jan-Feb 77).....	53

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GDR'S KROLIKOWSKI INTERVIEWED ON GDR-POLISH RELATIONS

East Berlin Domestic Service in German 2110 GMT 27 May 77 LD

[Klaus Franke interview with Herbert Krolikowski, GDR state secretary for foreign affairs; date and place of interview not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Franke] Comrade state secretary, tomorrow we shall welcome a party and state delegation from Poland led by Comrade Edward Gierek, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. He comes to the GDR on an official visit. On this occasion, what kind of review of the development of our relations can be made? How have, in particular, party relations and cooperation between our states in the field of foreign affairs taken shape?

[Krolikowski] Before this important meeting, we can quite justifiably say that as far as GDR-Polish relations are concerned, new levels have been reached. Of decisive importance for this was, and is, the close and, above all, trusting cooperation between the SED and the PZPR. The relations between our parties moulds the relations between our states. Of great importance for cooperation are the regular meetings between the leading representatives of our parties and states. The meetings between Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of our party, and Edward Geirek, PZPR first secretary, provide ever fresh stimuli for mutual cooperation. In the period since our party's 8th PZPR Party Congress alone, there have been more than 20 such friendly meetings. The wide exchange of delegations between the central committees, the close cooperation between all the SED's bezirk directorates with the PZPR's voivodship committees, and the friendly links between many of our parties' district directorates result in a steady and very useful exchange of experience in all areas of socialist construction. Cooperation in the foreign political sphere too is continually taking place on the basis of socialist internationalism, and of the inviolable fraternal alliance with the party and country of Lenin, and is taking on totally new dimensions. Both states cooperate actively within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty in realizing the agreed coordinated policy and make their contribution to the realization of the CPSU's peace program. As partners in CEMA, both countries are actively engaged in the realization of the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration and so contribute to the strengthening of the might of socialism and to the safeguarding of peace and security in Europe and the world.

[Franke] Our two countries are presently realizing the commitments entered into in the past years between the party and state leaderships of the GDR and Poland for the development of economic relations. A number of agreements were concluded for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the national economies of the two countries. Which results are here of particular importance?

[Krolikowski] We can certainly talk of a dynamic course in our economic and scientific-technical cooperation. In all areas we can record a high and impressive growth rate. Here, the starting point for our two countries is the maximum securing of the fulfillment of the main tasks decided by the parties of the SED and the PZPR in both countries.

Let us take, for example, the expansion and deepening of cooperation and socialization. There are at present about 100 cooperation and specialization treaties, above all, in machine building, electrical engineering and electronics, and in the chemicals industries. The result of this is that the share of cooperative and specialized goods in the exchange of goods in 1976 was able to be increased by 3 percent compared with 1975, and in 1977 this share will continue to grow substantially. At present, more than 2,000 works and establishments are directly participating in the realization of the agreements concluded between our two countries. Particularly well-known among these are the mutual cooperation in the friendship cotton mill in Swinoujacie, the cooperation in the development of a production plant for the manufacture of fodder yeast from crude petroleum distillates in Schwedt, and the cooperation between our countries in the economic organization Interport.

Today, Polish consumer goods are also an integral part of the range of goods in our domestic trade. We can, therefore, say that the development of the exchange of goods during the past five-year plan was a logical result of this development. During the coming visit, further projects will be discussed with the aim of developing the existing opportunities in a planned manner for the benefit and mutual advantage of our peoples.

[Franke] The friendly alliance between our two peoples, in view of the history of German-Polish relations, certainly not a foregone conclusion. How was it, in your opinion, possible to bring about this historic turning point, of importance to the whole of Europe, in the relationship between the two peoples?

[Krolikowski] The relations between the Germans and the Poles was [word indistinct] burdened without doubt for centuries by the policy of the ruling and exploiting classes and [word indistinct] animosity and [word indistinct]. It is the historic desert of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Polish United Workers Party that coexistence between our peoples is being further developed in the spirit of fraternal friendship and all-round cooperation. This fundamental turning point in our relations came about after the working class in both countries took power into their own hands

and set up the socialist social order. Your two Marxist-Leninist parties, by carrying on the revolutionary traditions of the joint struggle of the German and Polish proletariat, and destroying imperialism with all its [word indistinct], they again showed the fundamental truth that only socialism can bring peoples together in inviolable friendship. Let me, in conclusion, once again state that the friendship visit which begins tomorrow by a Polish party and state delegation to the GDR will be an important event in the life of our peoples and international life. It will open, with the signing of a new treaty on friendship and assistance, a new and finer prospect for the all-round friendly cooperation between our parties, peoples and states, and marks out the path of our relations into the next century.

[Franke] I thank you Comrade Minister, for this interview.

CSO: 2300

BULGARIA

ORGANIZATIONS SUBORDINATED TO COMMITTEE OF ART AND CULTURE

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 5 Apr 77 pp 298-301

[Order No 206 of 31 December 1976 of the Council of Ministers Concerning the Application of the General Scheme for the Specialization, Concentration and Management of the National Complex "Artistic Creativity, Cultural Activities and the Mass Information Media"]

[Text] The Council of Minister orders:

1. Approval of the general scheme for the specialization, concentration and management of the National Complex "Artistic Creativity, Cultural Activities and the Mass Information Media."
2. Approval of the creative production and other organizations under direct subordination to the Committee for Art and Culture, according to the Appendix which comes into force as of 1 April 1977.

.....

4. As of 1 April 1977, the following organizations are to be abolished: The Committee for Television and Radio, the Bulgarian Printing DO [state trust], the Bulgarian Photography DO, the Book Publishing DO, the Book Trade and Stationary DO, the Scientific Research Institute for Television and Radio, and the Scientific Press Center.

The assets and liabilities of the abolished organizations as of 31 March 1977 and their rights and obligations are to be assumed by the newly formed organizations to which their activities are to be transferred according to the Appendix of Point 2.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers:
St. Todorov

Chief Secretary of the Council of Ministers:
Iv. Shpatov

Appendix for Point 2

Creative Production Organizations, Organizations for Scientific Services and Introduction of New Technology, Schools and Other Structural Units in the System of the National Complex "Artistic Creativity, Cultural Activities and the Mass Information Media" Under Direct Subordination to the Committee for Art and Culture

No [1]	Name of organizations, headquarters and area of activity [2]	Formed on basis of: [3]	Note [4]
1	Press Committee--legal entity, on economic accountability, with headquarters in Sofia and with area of activity: book publishing, book and stationary trade, printing and photography; providing physical plant for mass press	Bulgarian Printing DO, Book Publishing DO, Book Trade and Stationary DO, Photography DO	Newly formed
5	Bulgarian Television--legal entity, budget supported, with headquarters in Sofia and basic tasks: creation and transmission of TV programs; production of TV films; exchange of TV films and programs with other TV services	Corresponding activities of Committee for Television and Radio	Newly formed
3	Bulgarian Radio--legal entity, budget supported, with headquarters in Sofia and basic tasks: creation and broadcasting of radio programs; procedural leadership over wire radio propaganda; exchange of radio programs	Corresponding activities of Committee for Television and Radio	Newly formed
4	Bulgarian Cinematography DO--legal entity, on economic accountability, with headquarters in Sofia and area of activity: creation, repository, distribution, import and export of movie films	Bulgarian Cinematography DO; National Film Library	

- 5 Music, Theaters and Circuses DO--
 legal entity, budgeted supported with
 headquarters in Sofia and area of
 activity: creation and distribution
 of musical, theatrical and circus
 works, performances, records, video
 cassettes and video discs and
 artistic management activities
 Bulgarian Music Main
 Directorate; Bulgarian
 Circuses Directorate

- 6 Plastic Arts, Cultural Heritage and
 Library Sciences SO--legal entity
 with headquarters in Sofia and
 area of activity: directs activi-
 ties for the creation and pro-
 pagation of the plastic arts and
 their synthesis with architecture;
 locates, studies, protects and
 popularizes movable and immovable
 cultural monuments, directs the
 organization of archeological digs;
 aids the scientific institutes in
 scientific analysis of historical
 past; directs activities of
 museums, galleries and libraries in
 the nation; directs activity in the
 creation and distribution of artis-
 tic folk crafts
 National Institute for Monu-
 ments in Sofia; State Com-
 mission for Fine Arts and
 Architecture; Kiril and Metodiy
 Library in Sofia; National
 museums and galleries and
 other museums in the system of
 the Committee for Art and
 Culture

The trust includes:

National Institute for Cultural
 Monuments

State Commission for Fine Arts and
 Architecture

Statute according to
 Decree No 93 of Council
 of Ministers, 1976

Statute according to
 Decree No 19 of Council
 of Ministers, 1976

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
The trust provides functional leadership over the Association of Masters of Artistic Folk Arts			
7	Center of Amateur Artistic Activities --a division, budget supported with headquarters in Sofia and area of activities: procedural and organizational leadership and aid in development of amateur artistic activities	Center for Amateur Artistic Activities	Statute of Association according to its Charter Statute and tasks according to Order No 418 of 1972 of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers
8	Culture Scientific and Production Association with headquarters in Sofia with area of activities: scientific and applied research on the physical facilities of culture; designing and production of specially made and small series devices, machines and equipment, materials and other specific articles for culture	Culture Scientific and Production Combine in Sofia	
9	Khemus Foreign Trade Organization--economic organization, legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and area of activity: import and export of printed works, artistic and other cultural articles and valuables	Khemus Foreign Trade Company in Sofia	
10	Copyright Agency--legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and area of activity: control of application of copyright legislation, protection of the rights of Bulgarian and foreign authors in Bulgaria and Bulgarian authors abroad	Copyright Agency--Sofia	Supported according to Decree No 54 of 1974 of the Council of Ministers
11	Material and Technical Supply and Transport Directorate--division, on economic accountability with headquarters in Sofia and area of activities:	Supply Depot under Bulgarian Cinematography DO	Newly formed

delivery of machines, equipment, instruments, spare parts, materials and so forth for needs of creative production organizations, maintenance and operation of transport and complex

- | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|
| 12 | Center for Designing and Building of Unique Cultural Projects--division, budget supported, with headquarters in Sofia and area of activities: providing designs and leadership over construction of national cultural projects | Bureau for Competitions and Designing under the Committee for Art and Culture | Newly formed |
| 13 | Scientific Research for Culture under the Committee for Art and Culture and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences with headquarters in Sofia and area of activities: elaboration and study of the basic questions in the development and management of Bulgarian culture and the mass information media; coordination of all scientific research on the questions of culture and the mass information media in the nation; the elaboration of forecasts, standards and procedures | Scientific Research Institute for Culture under the Committee for Art and Culture and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; Scientific Press Center; Scientific Research Institute for Television and Radio | Structural unit in the development block of the Committee for Art and Culture |
| 14 | Creative Fund under the Committee for Art and Culture--division, with headquarters in Sofia and basic tasks: provide material conditions for development of creative process and encouragement of creators in the area of art, culture and science | Creative Fund under the Committee for Art and Culture | Activities and support according to Law Governing Creative Funds |
| 15 | Higher institutions of learning
Bulgarian State Conservatory, Sofia
Kr. Sarafov Higher Institute for Theatrical Arts, Sofia | Bulgarian State Conservatory, Sofia
Kr. Sarafov Higher Institute for Theatrical Arts, Sofia | |

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	N. Pavlovich Higher Institute for Fine Arts, Sofia	N. Pavlovich Higher Institute for Fine Arts, Sofia	
	Higher Music Pedagogical School, Plovdiv	Higher Music Pedagogical School, Plovdiv	
16	Semihigher institutions of learning		
	Institute for Musical and Choreographic Personnel, Sofia	Institute for Musical and Choreographic Personnel, Sofia	
	State Librarian Institute, Sofia	State Librarian Institute, Sofia	
	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Varna	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Varna	
	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Blagoevgrad	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Blagoevgrad	
	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Khaskovo	Institute for Cultural Educational Personnel, Khaskovo	
17	Secondary schools		
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Fine Arts, Sofia	Secondary Special Artistic School for Fine Arts, Sofia	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Personnel, Tryavna	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Personnel, Tryavna	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Fine and Monumental Arts, Plovdiv	Secondary Special Artistic School for Fine and Monumental Arts, Plovdiv	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Stage Personnel, Plovdiv	Secondary Special Artistic School for Stage Personnel, Plovdiv	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Industrial Molds, Kazanluk	Secondary Special Artistic School for Industrial Molds, Kazanluk	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Troyan	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Troyan	
	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Kotel	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Kotel	

	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Smolyan	Secondary Special Artistic School for Applied Arts, Smolyan	
	Secondary Music School, Varna	Secondary Music School, Varna	
	Secondary Music School, Burgas	Secondary Music School, Burgas	
	Secondary Music School, Kotel	Secondary Music School, Kotel	
	Secondary Music School, Pleven	Secondary Music School, Pleven	
	Secondary Music School, Ruse	Secondary Music School, Ruse	
	Secondary Music School, Plovdiv	Secondary Music School, Plovdiv	
	Secondary Music School, Sofia	Secondary Music School, Sofia	
	State Choreographic School, Sofia	State Choreographic School, Sofia	
	Secondary Music School, Stara Zagora	Secondary Music School, Stara Zagora	
	Secondary Music School, village of Shiroka Luka, Smolyan Okrug	Secondary Music School, village of Shiroka Luka, Smolyan Okrug	
	Unified Secondary Polytechnical Boarding School, Sofia	Unified Secondary Polytechnical Boarding School, Sofia	
	Yu. Fuchik Technical School for Printing and Photography, Sofia	Yu. Fuchik Technical School for Printing and Photography, Sofia	
	Center for Study of Foreign Languages, Sofia	Center for Study of Foreign Languages, Sofia	Newly formed
18	Center for Postgraduate Study, Sofia--division, budget supported with basic tasks: raising skills of leading personnel in complex		
19	Other Units		
	Newspaper NARODNA KULTURA	Newspaper NARODNA KULTURA	
	Magazine OBZOR	Magazine OBZOR	
	Home of Veterans of Art, Sofia	Home of Veterans of Art, Sofia	

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
-----	-----	-----	-----

Rest Home, Balchik

Rest Home, Balchik

Note. The creative production organizations of the complex and their divisions, in their activities which are of an economic character, are to apply the enforceable enactments regulating economic activities in the nation, and the specific rules when such are established according to the appropriate procedure.

EAST GERMANY

'NEUES DEUTSCHLAND' COMMENTS ON TITO'S BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 25 May 77 p 5 AU

[Article by Prof Dr Guenter Heyden: "Respected Workers' Leader, Statesman and Internationalist: On the 85th Birthday of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] and LCY Chairman"]

[Text] Today, on 25 May, Comrade Josip Broz Tito, SFRY president and LCY chairman, celebrates his 85th birthday. On this day, our cordial congratulations are due to the respected leader of the Yugoslav workers class and prominent struggler of the international and communist workers movement, a politician and statesman who has devoted his entire life to the interests of the working people. His name is inseparably linked with the Yugoslav peoples' struggle against capitalist exploitation and national oppression, with their heroic liberation struggle against the fascist occupiers. At the same time, his name is a symbol for the formation and flourishing of the new socialist Yugoslavia.

In late August 1928, the INTERNATIONALE PRESSE-KORRESPONDENZ, under the headline "A Cry From the Hell of Yugoslav Jails," reprinted a letter from Josip Broz Tito, then secretary of the Yugoslav Leather Workers Association and official of the Zagreb Communist Party branch, which he had succeeded in smuggling out of the Zagreb police jail. In this letter, he reported the circumstances under which he had been arrested and the monstrous charges leveled against him, as well as the tortures to which the inmates were exposed. "I was asked to incriminate outstanding workers functionaries. The agents are threatening me with death---protest and help me. I would rather die than confirm the lying incriminations and denunciations of my comrades requested by the police," the letter reads. The attitude expressed in these plain lines is typical of the entire career of the now 85-year-old SFRY and LCY chairman Josip Broz Tito.

In the Front Line of Revolutionary Strugglers

This path, on which he embarked by entering the Social Democratic Party in 1910, led him during the Great October Socialist Revolution and in the civil

war years in Soviet Russia to the side of the Bolsheviks, into the Red Guards, as a member of which he participated in the struggle against the White Guardsmen in the Omsk area. Fifty years later, on the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Comrade Tito wrote in an article: "If there had been no Socialist October Revolution, and if the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against the fascist hordes during the Great Fatherland War, did not exist, there would have been no victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia either, and the socialist transformations in many other European countries would not have taken place."

Thus, even before the forming of the socialist Yugoslav state, Josip Broz Tito stood in the front ranks of the revolutionary strugglers, in the Communist Party. A member of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee since 1934, he was dispatched in that same year to work in the Balkan section of the communist international in Moscow, where he worked together with such outstanding functionaries of the international communist workers movement as Georgi Dimitrov and Wilhelm Pieck. There he also participated in the historic Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. In that period from the end of 1937 to early 1939, Tito--this is how he called himself in the underground--assumed the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and, under complex conditions, he formed its new central committee in the country and decisively contributed to the party's ideological and organizational consolidation. Under Tito's leadership, the Yugoslav Communist Party formed an antifascist popular mass movement in an underground struggle immediately before World War II which, after the fascist attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, developed into the antifascist Peoples Liberation Movement. In this, too, the Communist Party proved to be an inspiring and organizing force, which systematically prepared the armed uprising against the fascist occupiers.

On the day of the German fascist army's insidious attack against the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Communist Party's Central Committee addressed a special appeal to the Yugoslav peoples which read in part: "The fateful hour has come. The decisive battle against the worst enemies of the workers class has begun, a battle which the fascist criminals have themselves unleashed by their treacherous attack on the Soviet Union--the hope of working people throughout the world. The heroic Soviet people's precious blood is being shed not only for the defense of the country of socialism, but also for the ultimate social and national liberation of the entire working mankind. Therefore, this struggle is also our struggle and we must support it with all our strength, even sacrificing our lives." Josip Broz Tito stood at the head of the partisan units that heeded this appeal and dealt serious blows to the fascist aggressors in the memorable battles of Neretva and Sutjeska.

In close comradeship of arms with the soldiers of the Soviet Army, the Peoples Liberation Army led by Marshal Tito had liberated the entire country from the occupiers by May 1945. The victorious completion of the Belgrade operation in October 1944 became one of the most glorious pages in the history of the joint struggle of the people of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union against fascism.

With All Strength for the People's Well-being

Hand in hand with the country's liberation, began the building of a new life in Yugoslavia. Decisive foundations for the socialist construction in free Yugoslavia were established by completely depriving the bourgeois-monarchist rulers of their power, by transferring industry and the banks into peoples' ownership, and by the land reform.

In the more than 3 decades since the liberation, the Yugoslav peoples have achieved significant successes in socialist construction. They have not only overcome the backwardness in the country's development inherited from capitalism, but have transformed Yugoslavia into a modern industrial-agricultural state. In that time, Comrade Tito has held the highest state and party posts. He has performed tremendous work in organizing the socialist construction in Yugoslavia, and has devoted his strength and energy to the well-being of the people. In recognition of his historic merits, Yugoslavia's highest people's representative body, the Federal Assembly, elected him president of the republic in January 1953. Even now, the today 85-year-old holds this high post as well as the chairmanship of the LCY, as the party has called itself since 1952. In 1974, these two functions were conferred on him for life.

In his report at the 10th LCY Congress in May 1974, Comrade Tito was able to point with pride to considerable results of the working peoples' efforts, and above all those of the Yugoslav communists. "Between the ninth and tenth party congresses," it reads there, "the LCY continued the struggle for the further material, social and cultural transformation, for the strengthening of socialist self-management, for the development and consolidation of the equality of rights, fraternity and unity of our nations and nationalities... as well as against all inconsistencies, deviations and fluctuations on the path of our revolution, which has developed and is still developing in keeping with the theoretic guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism as applied to our specific conditions." He stressed that it was particularly important to strengthen the role of the workers class and democratic centralism in the party, to even more consistently struggle against nationalist phenomena, and first and foremost to insure greater scope in the life of society for the workers class' revolutionary concept of the world, Marxism-Leninism. To be able to successfully accomplish the forthcoming historic tasks, Comrade Tito stated in conclusion, "The LCY must be a party of revolutionary action, the vanguard in the workers class, the working people, the nations and nationalities of our country need today and will need in the future."

Josip Broz Tito's many decades of successful activity at the head of the LCY and the SFRY has considerably contributed to socialist nonaligned Yugoslavia's becoming an important factor in international relations, in the struggle for peace and security. Comrade Tito has always come out consistently for the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence

between states with different social systems, for the political solution of conflicts, for the participation on the basis of equal rights of all countries in the solving of international basic problems. His resolute support for the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina against imperialist aggression, for the interests of the Arab peoples against Israel's predatory policy is well known.

Socialist Yugoslavia has played an important role in the nonaligned movement since this movement was brought into existence at the Belgrade conference in 1961, also on Comrade Tito's personal initiative. Yugoslavia also actively engaged itself in the spirit of consolidating world peace and social progress at that movement's subsequent conference--in Cairo, Lusaka, Algiers and last August in Colombo. At numerous international conferences, UN General Assembly sessions and, last but not least, during his many meetings with statesmen and politicians of the most various countries, Tito has come out passionately and actively for the cause of peace and understanding among peoples. Thus he stated in his speech at the CSCE in Helsinki: "We are living today at a time when the peoples are waging a more and more resolute struggle for freedom and independence, for peace and equal security for all, for equality of rights, and for all-round cooperation, for economic and social progress. The epoch of colonialism and imperialism, as well as of various forms of political and economic oppression of the peoples is...irresistibly nearing its end before our eyes."

His indefatigable espousal of the cause of peace and friendship among peoples, and his lifelong struggle against war and fascism, imperialism and colonialism, have earned him high respect among all the progressive people in the world. It speaks for his profound affinity with his party and class, when he stated in an interview a year ago that this prestige was in no case his merit, "but first and foremost the merit of my strugglers during the peoples' liberation war, the merit of my party which I have now been heading for so many years, the merit of my peoples who, up to now, even at the most difficult moments, have always placed their full confidence in me."

A Solid Foundation of Cooperation

The Yugoslav statesman has made numerous trips to the socialist countries. He has visited the USSR several times. The official friendship visit of Comrade Josip Broz Tito, SFRY president and LCY chairman, to the GDR in November 1974 is vivid in the memories of the GDR citizens. Proceeding from the results of the talks and negotiations conducted between the leadership of the two parties and states at that time, between Erich Honecker and Josip Broz Tito, the cooperation between the SED and the LCY, and between the GDR and the SFRY, has reached a high level in the past few years. In the meantime, Comrades Tito and Honecker have met three more times; that is, at the CSCE in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, at the conference of the European communist and workers' parties in Berlin last June and, only recently, this January during the visit of the GDR party-state delegation, led by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman

of the GDR State Council, to the SFRY. All these meetings were marked by the effort jointly to contribute to the further strengthening of peace and socialism in the world. "We are linked by the avowal of the revolutionary ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin," the general secretary of the SED Central Committee and GDR State Council chairman stated after awarding the Karl Marx Order to Comrade Tito. "We are united by the noble aim of socialism. This is a solid foundation for collaboration. It is to our deep satisfaction that the relations between the SED and the LCY are developing well." The SFRY president and LCY chairman noted: "I am convinced that you, just as well as we, can state with pride that the working people of our two countries have achieved significant victories in the building of socialism. We aspire to the same aims, even though we live under different conditions and hence the ways of seeking solutions to the individual problems are also different."

The joint communique signed at that visit opens up great prospects for the further deepening of the relations between the SED and the LCY, the GDR and the SFRY in all spheres. The communist spirit which marked the deliberations, and the atmosphere of friendship which surrounded our party state representatives during their entire visit, show that the meeting was one between friends and class comrades who are linked one with the other by the same ideals and aims.

This friendship is deeply rooted in the traditions of the Yugoslav and German communists' common struggle against capitalism, fascism and war. Jointly they fought in the ranks of the international brigades for the freedom of the Spanish people. As antifascists, the German communists, regardless whether in the concentration camps or in jails, underground or in exile, passionately declared their solidarity with the struggle the Yugoslav peoples, their heroic Peoples' Liberation Army under Communist Party leadership, with Comrade Josip Broz Tito at the head, conducted against Hitler barbarianism, side by side with the glorious Soviet Army.

Tito was honored with many high decorations for this untiring struggle against fascism and war, for his untiring stand for peace, friendship among the peoples, and understanding. He is the holder of the Yugoslav Order of People's Hero which has been awarded to him three times; of the Lenin Order, the highest decoration of the USSR; and of two Karl Marx orders, the highest GDR decoration.

We, the SED communists and GDR citizens, combine with our 85th-birthday congratulations the wish that Comrade Josip Broz Tito should be active for the benefit of the SFRY, in the interests of peace and socialism for many years to come.

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

BRIEFS

GREETINGS TO JORDAN--Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council conveyed most cordial congratulations to King Husayn on the occasion of the national holiday of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In the telegram he wished the Jordanian people further success in economic construction and in securing a peaceful future. Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers, sent a telegram of congratulations to Mudar Badran, Jordanian prime minister, on the same occasion. [Text] [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 25 May 77 p 2 AU]

CSO: 2300

WARSAW JOURNAL COMMENTS ON POLISH-FRG RELATIONS

Warsaw PAP in English 1205 GMT 29 May 77 LD

[Text] Warsaw, 29 May, PAP--The development of Polish-West German relations is still far from the actual needs and possibilities of the two sides. In almost all spheres there are concrete bases for a further intensification and development of mutual cooperation, but in some fields there are either no interstate agreements or the existing ones are not wide enough to make possible the achievement of successive results in the versatile process of normalization, writes Assistant Professor Jerzy Sulek in the monthly *SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE* in an article on Polish-West German political relations in the 1970's.

The author writes that the policy of understanding between Poland and the Federal Republic requires constant care, concern, and efforts on the part of Polish and West German governments, political circles and nations.

In the process of normalization of relations with Poland, only a part of the fundamental political forces of the FRG takes an active part. In this situation, the West German Government's attitude and policy towards Poland is extremely important.

As a result of different juridical opinions, the two states' interpretation of the treaty (on normalization of Polish-West German relations) is not the same, and there are difficulties in concluding some interstate agreements. This is also the cause of the difficulties encountered in the use of proper place names, the cartographic presentation of German frontiers, the implementation of recommendations on the revision of school manuals, or else the use of the term "expellees" with reference to people who chose to leave Poland for the FRG on the basis of the Polish-West German agreement.

The present relations between both countries can be dialectically defined as a state of "antagonistic cooperation," writes Jerzy Sulek. The point is, however, to further develop mutually advantageous cooperation based on

equal rights, the result of which should be a gradual change of proportions between confrontation and cooperation. Mutual cooperation should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and should take into account the two states' conditions and the reality of the situation in Europe.

Poland, despite the difficulties put up by some political forces in the FRG, is ready to continue the work of normalizing relations. Such a standpoint, however, does not mean that Poland is seeking agreement at all costs. Political wisdom, national pride and remembrance of the past define the limits of compromise, concludes Jerzy Sulek.

CSO: 2020

POLAND

BRIEFS

LONDON PRINTS CENSORED ITEMS--The first collection of Polish "underground" writing to be published in the West was released at a press conference in London yesterday. The publishers of the magazine INDEX ON CENSORSHIP have collected works by 17 Polish writers, in the original Polish. All the pieces included in this first volume, entitled ZAPIS I, were written in Poland, but were rejected for publication by the censor's office. Many have circulated in Poland in typewritten form. The authors include two members of the unofficial Workers' Defence Committee, formed in 1976. At the press conference, Prof Leszek Kolakowski of Oxford University drew attention to a hunger strike, which 10 people began yesterday in the chapel of a Roman Catholic church in Warsaw, over the imprisonment of five workers who took part in the 1976 food price riots. [Text] [London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 27 May 77 p 5 LD]

CSO: 2020

CHANGE IN DECREE ON TAXING OF NON-RESIDENTS' INCOME

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 42, 20 May 77 p 2

[Council of State Decree Amending Decree No 276/1973 on the Regulation of the Taxing of Income Realized in the Socialist Republic of Romania by Non-Resident Physical and Juridical Persons]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article I--Decree No 276/1973 on the regulation of the taxing of income realized in the Socialist Republic of Romania by non-resident physical and juridical persons, published in BULETINUL OFICIAL No 70 of 16 May 1973, is amended as follows:

Article 2 letter b) will have the following content:

"b) 15 percent, in the case of income from:

--projects of technical assistance, training of personnel, qualitative or quantitative control of goods, surveys, scientific or technical consultations, medical consultations and other services which are carried out in the Socialist Republic of Romania;

--air and naval transportation. The tax is collected only from beneficiaries of the income which have their headquarters or domicile in states which tax similar incomes obtained from these states by Romanian transportation enterprises.

The income realized in the Socialist Republic of Romania by beneficiaries which have their headquarters or domicile in states which apply to Romanian transportation enterprises a tax of less than 15 percent will be taxed by amounts at the level of those levied by these states. The taxes which will apply to the Romanian enterprises paying the taxes will be communicated to the Ministry of Finance by the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications."

Article II--The provisions of Article I apply to income realized after 1 January 1977.

Nicolae Ceausescu,

President of the Socialist Republic
of Romania

Bucharest, 16 May 1977
No 125

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

ROMANIAN-MONGOLIAN COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON DUGERSUREN VISIT

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 2 Jun 77 p 5 AU

[Joint Romanian-Mongolian communique on Mongolian Foreign Minister Mangalyn Dugersuren's visit to Romania, issued on 1 June, in Bucharest]

[Text] Between 28 and 31 May 1977, Mangalyn Dugersuren, minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, paid an official friendly visit to the Socialist Republic of Romania at the invitation of George Macovescu, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Mangalyn Dugersuren, minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, was received by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The two ministers of foreign affairs held talks in an atmosphere of sincere friendship and mutual understanding and esteem; during these talks they briefed each other about achievements and successes attained by their countries in implementing the decisions of the 11th RCP Congress and of the 17th MPRP Congress and exchanged views on continuously developing friendly relations and cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic and on certain current international problems of mutual interest.

The two ministers stressed the great importance of summit meetings and talks--particularly of the visit paid by the party-state delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania led by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Mongolian People's Republic and the visit paid by the party-government delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic led by Comrade Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal to the Socialist Republic of Romania--for developing mutually advantageous relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

The ministers reiterated the mutual desire of their governments to continuously develop relations of friendship and cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic on the basis of

Marxist-Leninist ideas and of the principles of full equality of rights, national sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, mutual respect and friendly assistance.

The two ministers noted with great satisfaction that trade relations and economic cooperation between the two countries continues to successfully develop, in the interest of the Romanian and Mongolian people. The minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic pointed out with satisfaction the technological and financial assistance granted by the Socialist Republic of Romania for the construction of certain industrial and cultural units in the Mongolian People's Republic.

During the exchange of views on international problems, the two ministers particularly stressed the fact that--due to the achievements attained by socialist countries in their socioeconomic development; due to their constructive initiatives and efforts; and due to the contribution made by developing countries, nonaligned states and anti-imperialist, peace-loving and democratic forces throughout the world--the cause of peace, security, national independence, democracy and socialism becomes increasingly stronger.

Both sides reasserted the determination of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic to continuously strengthen the unity of socialist countries and of anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and democratic forces, as an imperious requirement of the world progressive social development.

The participants in the talks stressed that the implementation of all principles and provisions of the final document of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe has a particular importance for strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world, for consolidating international security and for insuring mutually advantageous cooperation among states.

The two ministers expressed the hope that the forthcoming Belgrade meeting will make an important constructive contribution to implementing the principles and provisions of the final document of the Helsinki conference on security and cooperation and deepening the process of detente.

The sides expressed their solidarity with peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who are struggling against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for national freedom and for strengthening their political and economic independence and establishing a new international economic order. They reiterated the solidarity and support of the Romanian and Mongolian people with the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia, who are struggling for national independence, against colonialism, racism and apartheid.

The ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic stressed the need to deepen detente, strengthen peace and security and develop fruitful cooperation in Asia and other continents.

The sides emphasized that the struggle to end the armaments race and to make real progress in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, this is a task of primary importance devolving on all peace-loving forces. This goal was and remains one of the main guidelines for the foreign policy activity of both states.

The ministers reiterated that their governments advocate peaceful solutions to international conflicts and contentious problems through negotiations and with the active participation of all interested parties to benefit peace, independence and the social progress of all people.

The Socialist Republic of Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic advocate increasing the role and efficiency of the UN activity in strengthening international peace and security and solving key problems facing mankind.

The two ministers expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks, which highlighted the desire of both sides to expand and develop Romanian-Mongolian relations, to benefit the Romanian and Mongolian people and in the interest of strengthening the unity of socialist countries and the cause of peace, security and cooperation throughout the world.

Minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, Mangalyn Dugersuren invited minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, George Macovescu to pay an official friendly visit to Mongolia. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

ROMANIAN COMMENT ON BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF JOURNALISTS

Bucharest LUMEA in Romanian 5 May 77 p 21

/Article by Eugeniu Obrea/

/Text/ Seen through the bus window from a distance, it could be a gigantic greenhouse. The roof and glass walls try to capture the solar light. But the building, located near Sava and covering an area of 50,000 square meters with its unusual lines, is to host the coming general European meeting in Belgrade.

For the time being we find the atmosphere of a construction site. The head architect, Stoian Maximovici, is not worried: The schedule of projects will be respected, with the finishing touches to be made in the coming weeks. The main entrance, the point through which the delegates will enter the building, is still scattered with pipes, aluminum sheets or scraps of material. On the other hand the discussion hall soon can greet the guests even if the stands and floors are still covered with a transparent plastic to protect them. One's glance is drawn to the originality of the ceiling, done in inclined planes. Some 1,050 delegates can be seated here. It is the largest of the 11 conference halls (the "youngest child" has only 50 seats). Later the building, which is to be a center for congresses, will be enriched by an amphitheater which can seat 4,000.

We are visiting the inside of this building in which the architect's fantasy has been joined with the requirements for an activity taking place at high rates of intensity. Built in 11 months, the project costs 600 million dinars. On 1 June the builders will finish their work. Maybe even sooner. Beyond the pictures which bear the imprint of modernity, beyond the figures and designs, our thoughts go continually to the event which will mark the current European situation this summer: the meeting in Belgrade.

The first foreign visitors to the building, intended to serve the dialog of detente and cooperation, are journalists from 31 European countries, from the United States and Canada, meeting in the Yugoslav capital for the "roundtable" organized by the Journalists Federation of Yugoslavia together with the European Club of Journalists. Their presence at the site near Sava is not accidental: The discussion they held for two days had the theme of "the role of the press, radio and television in interpreting the final act of Helsinki." It was a positive discussion which, against the background of a natural diversity of viewpoints, brought out the journalist's responsibility at this point of European evolution. We also saw this idea in the messages addressed to the meeting by President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, President of Finland Urho Kekkonen and UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

The inaugural statement belonged to Mitja Gorjup, president of the Journalists Federation of Yugoslavia, who drew a picture of the situation on the continent in the last 21 months and prospects for it, placing into context the role of the means of mass communication. The final act of Helsinki represented the departure point, felt by its content to be "a balanced document and indivisible entity" which includes what is real and achievable under the present conditions in Europe. The Yugoslav journalist essentially stated that the document worked out by the participating states as sovereign and independent countries, with the speakers on an equal plane, offers a relatively stable political framework for promoting good relations between the European states, for overcoming divisions, for establishing relations of mutual trust. "One of the basic demands of this point in time," Gorjup mentioned, "not only is to draw up an inventory of what has been done until now but, above all, to give a new impetus to cooperation or, what is more necessary and possible, to ensure the continuity of the process which achieved merely a beginning in Helsinki.

The discussion in the elegant hall of the Yugoslavia Hotel was arranged on two planes: On one hand, there was an attempt to evaluate the successes and failures in implementing the final act of Helsinki and estimate the prospects for the rounded future of the dialog between the European states, which Belgrade will host; on the other hand, there was visible the wish to define the concept of the journalist's responsibility for the process of building European security and cooperation. The many speeches, limited by time--especially toward the end of the deliberations when the list of speakers had become impressive--generally brought out the constructive treatment, sense of realities, understanding of the need to advance in the direction worked out before in Helsinki. I listened to my colleagues from LE MONDE,

PRAVDA, POLITIKA, WASHINGTON POST, L'UNITA, JOURNAL DE GENEVE and from other newspapers and magazines and from radio and television stations. Of course, the opinions they advanced were not, nor could they be, in agreement. However, the predominant thing is the conviction expressed in one form or other by all the speakers that the process of detente in Europe can and must be continued and deepened. The dominant opinion was that there is no alternative to detente and that the final act of Helsinki, far from being a "declaration of good intentions," represents the specific platform which permits active cooperation in the interest of all peoples on the continent. A Dutch colleague correctly remarked pure and simple that a document which could be interpreted in various ways was not worked out in Helsinki, but rather a new basis for inter-European relations was created.

The ensuring of European security and cooperation is based on respect for each state's independence and sovereignty, on an open and concrete dialog, on democratization of relations on the continent, on treatment of the final act as a unified whole, refusing amputations which can distort the content. There were ideas expressed, fragmentary or total, by Mikko Valtasaari of Finland Radio-Television, Paolo Murialdi, president of the Capri Club, Charles Flores of the MALTA NEWS, Gunther Kertzsch of NEUS DEUTSCHLAND, Hella Pick of the GUARDIAN, among others. The exchanges of opinions did not lack harshness; in some cases the emphasis was placed on one aspect or another, marginalizing the view of the speech. But basically the availability for the effort to deepen the course of detente in Europe remains.

In this framework the problem of the journalist's responsibility was posed, taking into account the influence of the press on public opinion. Replying to those who asserted that they do not politicize, Jean Schwoebel of LE MONDE felt that journalists do not politicize in the sense that they do not make decisions but they do politicize when they address themselves to public opinion. But Joe Mullholand (Irish Radio Broadcasting) stressed that the journalist, without correctly assuming his responsibilities, cannot aspire to the respect of public opinion and that clearly there are differences of systems but that, despite these differences, the same wish to live in peace is visible. There was often mention of the fact that the intention of our profession is not only to reflect events and record them but to meditate deeply over these events. In this context opinions were heard on the need for a journalist's code of conduct (Gunther Nennig of Austria's NEUES FORUM). The correctness of information and interpretations is inseparable from the real agreement with the general standards of detente.

The Romanian delegation put forth the principles which are at the basis of Romanian press activity and which, in the spirit of the party's policy, militates for implementation of the provisions and arrangements written in the Helsinki document in a unified vision, for broad collaboration under conditions of full equality, among all states on the continent, treating the prospects of the coming Belgrade meeting in a constructive manner. A constructive spirit involves placing the elements which can develop understanding in the forefront and that which unites the European peoples and states, joining them in investigating the directions for deepening the process of European security and cooperation. With the framework of the contacts made, it was a new occasion for the Romanian journalists at the "roundtable" to note the constant interest and positive evaluation of socialist Romania's position.

The dialog of journalists held in Belgrade once again showed that it is possible for the path of better knowledge among the European states to be traveled when an appeal is made to good will and realism. On a continent which can be crossed from one end to another in just a few hours' flight, in a Europe which historic destiny has obligated to decipher the ways for peaceful coexistence, but which is confronted with many difficult problems, the ones who address millions upon millions of readers, viewers or listeners through the printed word, the radio and the television screen brought out with appropriate nuances the understanding of their duty and role. The dominant note was given by the hope conditioned only on prudence--for the real possibility to continue detente and the conviction that the journalist can contribute to the positive course of events.

8071

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

TOMA APPOINTMENT--Inasmuch as one of the positions of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Bacau County People's Council has become vacant, on the basis of Article 72 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the people's councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Constantin Toma is delegated to execute the function of deputy chairman of the executive of the Bacau County People's Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 42 20 May 77 p 3]

CSO: 2700

PEACETIME COMMAND/STAFF PLANNING OUTLINED

Belgrade VOJNOEKONOMSKI PREGLED in Serbo-Croatian No 1, Jan-Feb 77 pp 17-32

[Article by Col Nikola Cubra, Ph.D.: "Planning and Programming the Operations of Commands and Staffs in Peacetime"]

[Text] The Planning of Operations as a Component of the Planning System in the Armed Forces

Development of the armed forces, of combat systems and of military equipment is proceeding at such a pace that a qualitative improvement is needed in the organization and performance of commands and administrations toward the overall goal of applying the available resources to the needs of war and armed conflict. That is why most of the advanced countries have been intensely concerned in the last 10 years to improve the organization and methodology of planning in the armed forces and have been committing huge funds to provide the personnel and wherewithal for improvement of this function. The whole point of this effort is to achieve the maximum combat capability of units, institutions and commands with the resources allocated to meet the needs of the armed forces. The decisions taken in the process of planning and programming have a paramount role and importance in this context.

The results achieved in planning the development of our armed forces are well known, but efforts still need to be made in all units, institutions and commands to make planning and decisionmaking more effective.

Planning can be divided into three characteristic domains with respect to subject matter, content and methodological procedure in peacetime planning in the armed forces:

Planning the Use of the Armed Forces in Wartime Situations. Contingency plans concerning the use of the armed forces as a whole or of their individual parts--units, which are devised on the basis of the strategic, operational and tactical requirements of their commitment, have an essential bearing on the planning of their development and on the planning of the operations of commands and staffs. Needs determined in devising contingency plans are used as the basis for determining the requirements which represent

the point of departure for compilation of development plans of units and institutions and operational plans of commands and staffs.

Development planning encompasses all the tasks involved in ensuring the constant expansion and growth of the organizational, personnel and materiel factors in the combat capability of the armed forces. It includes establishment of the table of organization of the armed forces supplying them with arms and equipment, personnel recruitment and development, construction of buildings and engineering preparation of terrain, construction and maintenance of special-purpose facilities for the production and repair of arms and military equipment, and also the planning of major current projects and activities which contribute to maintaining and further strengthening the combat capability and readiness of the armed forces.

The development of these elements should be governed by the needs of national defense as set forth when the contingency plans are devised (the national defense plan or war plan). It should also be borne in mind that the level achieved in development of the armed forces represents a limit when contingency plans are devised.

Planning the operations of staffs and commands is aimed at performance of tasks set forth in the contingency and development plan and also at performance of other tasks required to prepare the armed forces for defense of the country. The operational plans of commands and staffs are accordingly closely related to contingency and development plans (see Diagram 1). On the basis of the contingency and development plans established for units and institutions, staffs and commands plan their own tasks and guide activity toward excellence, timeliness and minimum expenditures in the fulfillment of those plans. The results which commands and staffs achieve in performance of their tasks have a feedback effect on the level of excellence in preparation and fulfillment of contingency and development plans.

One can conclude from the interdependence we have described in planning the use and development of units and institutions and in planning the operations of commands and staffs that the quality of planning in this field will depend on the quality of planning of the armed forces as a whole. If good contingency and development plans exist, then the basis exists for determining the tasks of staffs and commands, while performance of those tasks guarantees excellence in the compilation and fulfillment of contingency and development plans, which in turn makes for development of the combat capability of the armed forces. If these plans are not interlinked, resources and work of commands and staffs may be oriented toward less important tasks, and tasks important to enhancement of combat capability may be performed hastily and poorly.

With the aim of advancing this activity in our armed forces still further, we will present certain of the more important principles which ought to be adhered to in peacetime operational planning in staffs and commands, and then the types of plans and procedures used in compiling them; we will also

indicate certain measures which ought to be taken in the coming period to enhance the effectiveness of planning in this field.




Diagram 1

The operations of commands and staffs are planned so as to eliminate the element of chance and haphazardness in operations and to deliberately encourage selection of the most favorable actions to achieve maximum results. This is an important function of direction and command.* The planning of

* Direction is usually divided into four functions:

- 1) planning, which is the ongoing process of setting goals and tasks and of finding the optimum way to achieve them. This is the function of determining what is to be done by whom and where and when it is to be done;
- 2) organization in the sense of setting up systems (organization, personnel and equipment) which will perform the tasks which have been planned and in the sense of specifying the way in which they should function (area of responsibility and competence) in performing the tasks which have been planned;
- 3) coordination, which is the process of directing operations and of synchronizing the work of participants in carrying out the tasks which have been planned and which have been organized;
- 4) followup on performance of tasks and on achievement of the desired results. Some authors cite decisionmaking and the issuing of orders as separate functions of direction and command. However, decisions must be made and orders given in each of these four functions, so that we see no need of

the operations of commands and staffs should be done as a continuous process. Planning is an uninterrupted creative job to be done by commands and staffs. To a large extent it determines the basis for performance of other functions of direction (organization, coordination and followup). Planning determines all three functions, but each of these functions also has a feedback on each of the others. Good results can be expected in the planning of tasks if staffs and commands are effective in organizing, coordinating and monitoring the fulfillment of tasks.

The organization and methodology of planning vary depending on the nature of the field in which they are done. Nevertheless, a planning system whose conception is up-to-date presupposes that a certain number of principles will be applied. Because the importance of applying the individual principles may vary, we will discuss those principles whose application has particular importance in planning the operations of staffs and commands.

The principle of a scientific approach to planning assures the plan a creative role in assignment of priorities and in determination of the way in which tasks are to be performed. In practical terms implementation of this principle requires that maximum use be made of scientific knowledge in the relevant fields of science when planning targets are being set and when the search is made for the best ways of fulfilling them. In addition, in staffs and commands at the higher levels the compilation of plans should be preceded by studies and analyses necessary to determination of the best ways of performing tasks. Application of the principle of a scientific approach to planning would also include use of up-to-date methods and equipment in the process of compiling plans and monitoring their fulfillment.

Planning, regarded as a scientific discipline aimed at fulfillment of tasks, makes practical use of dialectical materialism, political economy, sociology, statistics, mathematical methods (operations research, intersectorial analysis, etc.), system analysis, the procedures of automatic data processing, a knowledge of cybernetics in monitoring fulfillment of planning targets, and so on. It is especially important to use the knowledge of military science and discipline in planning the operations of staffs and commands.

The principle of realism in planning consists of planning targets in conformity with real capabilities of meeting them.

Planning a larger volume of tasks than real capabilities allow for and the planning of tasks below objective capabilities have adverse consequences.

Planning a smaller volume of tasks than could actually be done (undershooting) and the planning of excessively high and unrealizable targets

classifying them on the basis of the same criterion. Decisions and orders are actually methods used in planning, organization, coordination and followup as administrative functions. We might say that decisionmaking and the issuing of commands represent the final form which these functions take.

(overshooting) can act as a disincentive on commitment of personnel in the command (staff). For example, if a command or staff plans a volume of tasks smaller than the capability of available personnel, some operatives might not commit themselves fully, calculating that the planning targets can easily be met. Or, in the opposite case, if more tasks are planned than can be objectively performed with the available personnel, then there is ordinarily a retrenchment toward fulfillment of only some of the tasks, and they need not always be those which have priority within the overall operations of the command or staff.

The institutional principle means that there must be regulations in the planning system which specify the types of plans and their content and the competence and responsibility of various agencies in preparing and enacting plans and in monitoring their fulfillment. Unless planning is based on good organization and methodology, one cannot realistically expect effective planning, nor can one expect that planning targets will be realistically set and their fulfillment effectively monitored. When we speak of the organization of planning, we are referring to the competence and responsibility of participants in the planning process, the form of document used in planning and in recording fulfillment of plans, and procedure used in compiling plans and in monitoring their fulfillment.

Commanding officers of units and institutions bear the greatest responsibility for the effective organization and performance of planning and for competent and punctual fulfillment of planning targets in commands and staffs. Their responsibilities are basically these: realism and good timing in setting the tasks which commands (staffs) and units (institutions) within their table of organization will perform; followup on performance of planning targets; providing the personnel and materiel to perform the planning targets, and decisionmaking concerning the amendment of plans.

All elements in the table of organization of the staff or command should be involved in the work of planning and in the work of organizing and following up on performance of tasks. Realistic planning and performance of tasks can be guaranteed only by those elements which commit themselves to their performance. The commanding officer must provide the essential elements such as priority, deadlines, available personnel and materiel, and so on.

In addition to the commitment of elements in the table of organization, there is frequently a need, particularly in higher staffs and commands, for an agency or an individual to be assigned to plan and monitor fulfillment of operational plans of the staff or command either in addition to regular duties or as an exclusive assignment. This work usually consists of the following: drafting a proposed scheme for the organization and procedures to be used in preparing and monitoring operational plans of the command and of its subordinate units and institutions; coordinating the work of the other elements of the command (staff) in preparing and compiling plans and distribution to immediately subordinate elements in the table of organization the data they require for preparation of their own operational plans;

unification and reconciliation of the operational plans of the elements of the command (staff) and their immediately subordinate elements; processing and delivery of data to superior elements concerning the course of fulfillment of planning targets.

The principle of internal consistency means that an overall examination must be made of needs for and ways of performing all the tasks of the command or staff in the period of time for which the plan is being adopted (in the course of a single year, for example). Unless all the tasks which an organizational unit is to perform are examined at one and the same time, it is not possible to balance out the available personnel and materiel.

The principle of continuity guarantees that the plan is monitored throughout its fulfillment and brought up to date if necessary. In recent years this term has been used more and more to signify that there is always a plan outstanding for a specified period of time (5 years, say). There is always a 5-year plan to be fulfilled because as each part of the period of time covered by the plan expires (1 year, say, in a 5-year period), the plan is then extended by the length of that period (by adding 1 year in our example).

Application of the principle of continuity is much more important for development plans than for operational plans. If operational plans are adopted for the same period as development plans, which is in fact a necessity, then the principle of continuity is also ensured in the planning of task performance.

The two-way principle in planning means that the planning function is continually performed from higher toward lower levels of direction and command and also in the opposite direction from bottom up. This guarantees the necessary exchange of information indispensable to guiding the operations of subordinate elements, for developing their initiative, for monitoring the course of task performance, for timely information about the course of fulfillment of tasks, and for decisionmaking concerning steps to be taken if the actual task performance departs from the projection.

The two-way principle in the planning of task performance in the armed forces should be enforced by having superior commands and officers assign the basic elements to be used in compilation of plans by subordinate elements and units, and then on the basis of the specific conditions of task performance, which are best known by them, they would prepare their plans in the form of proposals.

The democratic principle (the principle of commitment) in planning means that all elements and individuals show initiative and figure as active participants in preparation, adoption and fulfillment of the plan. The initiative and active commitment of T/O elements in the preparation and performance of tasks should be fully manifested in military planning as a general thing and also in planning the operations of staffs and commands. However, responsibility for adoption of plans and for the decisions taken

during their fulfillment must be the affair of the competent officers. This means that this principle can be manifested only if all elements and individuals within the command are actively committed in the preparation of the plan, but they would not be involved in making decisions on the tasks which are to be performed.

Types of Operational Plans

Staffs and commands prepare the following plans with respect to purpose, degree of detail in task descriptions and the length of the planning period:

1. Medium-term operational plans which set forth types of tasks, designate the elements responsible for performance of the tasks and sets deadlines for performance of the specific command or staff over a period of time longer than 1 year. Under our conditions it is our opinion that these plans should be prepared for a period of 5 years, which is also the period of development plans. They would state in greater detail and more elaborately the tasks and measures which are to be taken in the aim of more effective realization of the tasks set forth in the development plans. Medium-term plans would cover the more important exercises, conferences and similar assemblies, particularly those whose preparation lasts 2 calendar years or more. It ought to be mandatory for higher staffs and commands which adopt development plans to adopt medium-term operational plans as well.
2. All commands and staffs ought to adopt annual operational plans. If a command or staff adopts a medium-term task performance plan, then it should prepare the annual plan as an updated 1-year phase of that medium-term plan. The annual plan should also cover the more important exercises, conferences, seminars, meetings and similar assemblies held during the year.
3. Monthly operational plans are suitable for lower levels of command and also for individual agencies of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, the General Staff and the highest command. They set forth in more detail all the elements necessary to performance of various activities covered by planning projections in the annual plan and also all current tasks which are planned in the course of the month.
4. Programs concerning performance of individual projects might be prepared for large and complex projects whose performance involves a sizable number of participants whose activity is difficult to coordinate. Task programming, which in principle ought to be done before annual plans of commands and staffs are prepared, would set forth types of activities, their sequence, the time they should take, dates of commencement and completion, and the participants responsible for each of them.
5. Short-term plans which establish the personal involvement of individual officers in a particular interval are best adopted on a monthly basis.

The interlinkage among medium-term, annual and monthly task performance plans and programs for performance of individual projects and the monthly plan of individual officers is shown in Diagram 2.




Diagram 2

- Key:
1. Analysis of performance of medium-term plans
 2. Medium-term development plan
 3. Medium-term operational plan
 4. Programs covering performance of major projects
 5. Followup on task performance
 6. Annual plans of operations and financing
 7. Annual operational plan
 8. Analysis of performance of annual plans
 9. Monthly operational plan
 10. Monthly plan for individual officers
 11. Analysis of performance of monthly plans

In addition to these plans, operational plans may also be prepared on a semiannual or quarterly basis. If a particular staff or command organizes effective preparation of annual and monthly plans, programs for performance of individual projects and individual officer plans, there will be no great need to prepare semiannual and quarterly plans. However, the latter may replace the monthly operational plans where this proves expedient.

The choice as to the type of plan depends on the level of the particular command in the entire system of direction and command of the armed forces and on the character of the tasks it performs. When this decision is being made, it should be borne in mind that past performance plans are prepared and analyzed in order to guide and mobilize the personnel of commands and staffs and in order to determine the results which they are achieving. On the other hand, one must also bear in mind the feasibility of planning; that is, before a decision is made to introduce a particular type of plan in the command or staff, an assessment should be made as to what this would achieve in the system of direction and as to what kind of input of work personnel would have to make in preparing and monitoring fulfillment of that particular type of plan.

Medium-Term Plans

Medium-term operational plans must be prepared so that the activity of constituent elements of commands and staffs are guided over a fairly long period of time. They should be prepared on the basis of tasks which lie within the sphere of activity and competence of the particular command and staff, the orders and necessary elements obtained from superior commands, the available personnel and materiel, and the need for cooperation with subordinate and other commands and staffs and the agencies of the sociopolitical community.

As a general rule, and it also applies to medium-term operational plans, it is best that the plan be adopted by the commanding officer of the unit or institution to which the plan pertains. The use of the plan may be subject to prior consent of the superior officer, though it need not be, or it may depend on enactment of the plan of a higher command or staff. This would depend on the needs, conditions and procedures of the commands themselves. One possible solution is shown in Form No 1.

The data to be entered in the medium-term development [sic--translator's note] plan should be as follows:

Linkage with the documents used as the basis for assignment of the task is provided for in the medium-term operational plan (Column 2 [sic--translator's note]). These may be tasks adopted in the development plan, documents setting forth the need for performance of tasks related to the use of units and institutions, decisions and orders of superior officers, initiatives and proposals of commands and staffs, etc.

It is not recommended that tasks be defined in great detail in the medium-term plan because over a period of that length a great number of the relevant elements will change, and then a great deal of work would have to be done to update the plans. When most tasks are being planned for a period of time longer than 1 year it is sufficient to give only the name of the task without breaking it down into phases and activities. It is better to define the tasks in greater detail and more elaborately in annual and monthly plans and in programs for performance of individual projects.

Form 1. Form Used in Compiling Medium-Term Operational Plans of Commands and Staffs

Osnova za utvrđivanje zadatka	NAZIV ZADATKA	Oznaka zadatka	Nosilac izvršenja zadatka	Saradnici	Način verifikacije	Rok izvršenja	(8) Dinamika izvršenja po godinama				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	I	II	III	IV	V
							Planned				
							Done				
							Planned				
							Done				
							Planned				
							Done				
							Planned				
							Done				

- Key:
1. Basis for assignment of the task
 2. Name of the task
 3. Code number of the task
 4. Element responsible for performance of the task
 5. Collaborators
 6. Manner of verification
 7. Deadline
 8. Schedule of performance by years

For some projects it may be helpful to adopt alphabetical or digital codes so as to simplify procedure when participants communicate in performing the project in that they would not then have to give the full name of the project. Using a symbol instead of the full name of the project can also help to increase security of measures taken to perform the project.

Even the medium-term operational plan should designate the participant responsible for performance of the various tasks, collaborators and the manner of verification (Columns 5, 6 and 7 [sic--translator's note]).

Dates for commencement and completion of task performance can be set in 6-month periods, quarters or months of the calendar year in which the commencement or completion of the particular task is scheduled.

So that the time frame for performance of tasks can be seen more easily, a column can be given in the form of the medium-term plan to each year, and that column is used to indicate the period of time in which completion of the task is planned.

It is a good idea to divide into two parts the boxes in the columns of the medium-term plan where dates are given for commencement and completion of the task and which indicate the schedule of performance by years. In the top of the box one would put data on the planned dates and schedule for performance of tasks, and in the bottom part one would record actual dates of commencement and completion and the actual pace of task performance. Recording all the data on the same form saves paperwork in the keeping of records on plan fulfillment and makes it easier for the superior officer to compare the projected and actual situations. When a plan is being updated in a command or staff, an identical copy of the plan should be in the possession of the superior command. The course of task performance should be recorded on the copy in the possession of the command and staff at the moment when the change occurs (commencement or completion of the tasks), while recording should be done on the copy of the superior command at least once a year, at the end of the calendar year after analysis of performance of the annual plan. If necessary the superior officer may request particular data concerning fulfillment of tasks, and in that connection the course of fulfillment of the medium-term plan would be recorded at intervals shorter than 1 year.

In addition to indicating tasks on the form of the medium-term task-performance plan, particularly in the case of tasks which have not been assigned in advance by decision of the superior officer, brief verbal explanations should be provided, including the rationale (goal) that lies behind performance of the particular task.

It is best to amend the medium-term task-performance plan (renouncement of a task that has been planned or incorporation of a new one) when annual plans are being compiled. These amendments should also be accompanied by brief verbal explanations, and in the section for recording fulfillment of the plan there should be an indication of who made the decision to amend the plan and the date on which it was amended.

Annual Plans

Annual plans should be prepared on the basis of the medium-term plan* and orders of superior officers concerning performance of those tasks in the

* If the particular commands or staffs do not prepare medium-term plans, the basis for preparation of annual plans would be the elements obtained from the medium-term plans of the superior command or staff.

next year, the available personnel and materiel, and other necessary elements.

A modification of the form used for the medium-term plan might be used to indicate tasks in the annual plan.

Since the elements necessary to performance of tasks need to be given in more detail than in the case of the medium-term plan, aside from the name of the task in Column 3 [sic--translator's note], one should also indicate the phases of its performance, and information on participants responsible for performance of the task and deadlines for completion would be indicated for each individual phase.

The pace of fulfillment of the task would be indicated by quarters. When the dates and pace for planned performance of tasks are indicated, the initial situation must be indicated as well.

The intervals at which reports are to be made on fulfillment of tasks in the annual plan certainly must be considerably shorter than for the medium-term plan. It may be necessary for lower commands and staffs to report on fulfillment of the annual plan at the end of each calendar month.

Monthly Plans

Monthly plans serve as the basis for a detailed description of particular activities and for day-to-day direction of the performance of tasks given in the annual plan. The definition should be detailed enough so that there is precise indication of the role of individuals or teams within the staff or command. The planned and actual situations during the month can be recorded on the same form as for the medium-term and annual plan with suitable modifications. In addition to the name of the task and the phase of completion, one should also record in the proper column the individual activities that are involved. Dynamics of task performance may be indicated by 10-day periods.

In addition to monthly task performance plans for the period of 1 month, short-term plans may also be prepared for the work of individual officers. The type of involvement (official trip, presentation of a detailed report, meeting, etc.) may be given in days, and there may be an hour-by-hour schedule covering working hours. In the case of certain tasks assigned officers it may be worthwhile to also give the place where the relevant activity is to be performed or where the officer is to be located, along with other data.

Before officers approve the monthly operational plan, it is useful to hold a meeting of all personnel or officers of internal organizational units of the command or staff in order to analyze the results achieved and shortcomings in performance of tasks in the previous month. Good examples of task performance should be stressed so that they may be adopted more widely, and

shortcomings should be indicated so that in the coming planning period they will not be repeated or will be minimized. In these meetings there should be a presentation of the most important tasks which the command or staff will perform in the coming month, and the commitments of those responsible for carrying them out are indicated. The meeting should be organized and conducted in such a way as to put maximum emphasis on shortcomings in performance and to encourage the initiative of the personnel of the command and staff in proposing ways of performing tasks in the coming month.

Following adoption of monthly operational plans, it may be useful for each individual participating in performance and for particular persons assigned to perform particular tasks to prepare their own personal plans. These plans can be devised in various forms, beginning with an orally presented concept which is not written down and ending with a form which the competent officer would make obligatory for all persons in the command or staff. The personal performance plans must be simple and must not take a great deal of time to prepare and monitor. These plans can be incorporated in the workbook of the participants where a record is kept on their most important activities during the month.

Programs for Performance of Individual Projects

In some staffs and commands, particularly higher ones, it will be indispensable to prepare programs for performance of individual projects. This is especially true of projects which have particular importance to combat capability and readiness of units and institutions, projects whose performance involves a sizable number of participants--organizational units or individuals whose work is difficult to coordinate, and also projects whose completion is governed by a deadline.

Quite a number of analytical and graphical methods can be used effectively in devising programs for performance of individual projects. Gantt charts are suitable for monitoring performance of individual projects.

Flow chart techniques may have the following advantages over other methods: timeliness in projecting and assigning the size of individual tasks, deadlines for its completion and individual responsibilities for performance; precise determination of sequence and time of commencement and completion of each individual job (activity) within the overall project; selection of particular activities whose performance is urgent (critical); the setting up of an effective system of monitoring and reporting at places where the actual situation departs from the planned situation; it makes it easier to use computer equipment in preparing and monitoring the program for performance of complex projects; projects are performed faster and more economically, and quality of performance is better; and it is easier to determine the contribution of each participant.

Many commands and staffs have already used this technique in the planning performance of some projects. Experience in its use has shown that the

results have depended to a maximum degree on the realism of planning and of the commitment of participants.

If the flow chart technique is used in programming performance of a project, once the interdependence of activities (structure analysis) has been determined and time parameters (time analysis) have been assigned, it is useful to draw up a table of activities with calendar dates assigned for their commencement and completion.

Before preparation of a program for project performance is undertaken, regardless of the technique to be used, one must make a thorough study of the project: the size and character of the individual jobs involved, the availability of personnel and materiel, the conditions and deadlines for completion of individual phases and activities, the possibilities for involvement of collaborators, the manner in which the projects are to be performed, and other elements indispensable to making decisions on adoption of the program for performance. The work invested in study of the manner of performance of projects pays a manifold return in the saving that accrues during performance.

In principle programs for performance of individual projects should be prepared after adoption of the medium-term plan, but before preparation of the annual task performance plan. They should be prepared for the entire period of time in which the project is to be performed, and only those phases and activities whose performance is planned in a particular year or month would be included in the relevant annual and monthly plans.

When the projects are sizable and complex, especially when they involve a sizable number of participants, coordination and guidance of the activity of participants has a particular impact on the effectiveness of their performance. Over the last 15 years or so quite a number of methods and techniques now in widespread use in a large number of public activities were developed because of the need for efficient organization of coordination specifically in the performance of military projects. The most significant place is occupied by the various methods of operations research, which include flow chart techniques and methods of supervising the course of complex projects which are known as "project management" (project supervision, project direction).

Regardless of the content and quality of operation of the information system in the command or staff, if individual projects are to be effectively performed, there will have to be additional regulation of specific information content and information flows concerning their performance. It is particularly important to state in detail obligations and responsibilities should there be a departure from the program of project performance as adopted.

The personnel of the commands and staffs should be assigned to performance of individual projects as teams, especially in the case of projects which

are done on an occasional basis. The teams should be flexibly organized and adapted to the needs of each specific task. Particular attention should be paid to selection of team members and to the organization of their work.

Conclusion

There has been need for further development of the responsibility of staffs and commands for effective planning and monitoring of fulfillment of task performance plans. Exceptional tasks should be reduced to the absolute minimum and incorporated in the operational plans of commands and staffs only on the basis of a specified procedure. Results achieved in fulfillment of task performance plans are a significant factor in evaluating the success of units, individuals and individual officers. There is also a need for maximum integration of activity in planning task performance with other aspects of planning in the armed forces.

Certain normative acts need to be updated to provide for more comprehensive regulation of the organization and methodology of planning and of monitoring of task performance at all levels of direction and command. This would include, above all, specification of the types and content of the plans to be adopted by individual commands and staffs, competence and responsibility for preparation and adoption of plans and for monitoring their performance, deadlines for preparation and procedures for proposing and adopting supplemental tasks which have not been planned in regular procedure.

There is a need to designate the element or individual to be assigned the work of planning the operations of the command or staff and monitoring fulfillment of that plan either as an exclusive job or in addition to regular duties. Personnel working on these jobs should be trained in short instruction sessions specifically organized for this purpose.

The system of information used by superior commands and staffs to furnish the necessary elements to subordinate organizational units should be improved so that there is no particular difficulty in monitoring the course of fulfillment of tasks so that superior officers can easily inform themselves. Constant exchange of information between the various participants in the performance of tasks when they are not in the superior-subordinate relationship is also very important to task performance.

Specific institutions should be assigned to provide for constant gathering of information concerning methods and techniques being used in this field of planning in other countries and to make them available in good time and suitable form to commands and staffs. This would be a contribution to constant improvement of the planning system and of the activity of staffs and commands, which are not objectively in a position to keep abreast of all this information themselves.

The syllabi of military schools must include subject matter in the field of the organization and methodology of operational planning in commands and staffs. The emphasis should be on relating scientific achievements in this field to the specific conditions of their practical use in our own armed forces.

An occasional exchange of experience concerning the organization and methodology of operational planning in similar commands and staffs might also contribute quite a bit to improving activity in this field.

The preconditions in terms of organization, personnel and equipment must also be met so that up-to-date methods and techniques are more widely used in the activity of staffs and commands. This would help to free more people from routine tasks which can be done by machines and various technical aids and to assign more people to creative analytical tasks in the process of preparing and adopting decisions which machines will never be able to do regardless of technical refinements. However, we should not expect that the machine will replace personnel, but will only be a tool that will help in getting tasks done more easily, but this will be accomplished only insofar as personnel know how to make skillful use of the machine.

When we are aware of the steps that need to be taken to improve the effectiveness of planning and of monitoring task performance in commands and staffs, it is not difficult to conclude that there is not a single element or individual without its particular place in this activity. There is no need to give particular emphasis to the fact that staffs and commands at a higher level in the hierarchy of command and direction of the armed forces have both a larger and more responsible role in planning task performance. This also applies to officers--the greater the authority (rights and responsibilities) of their position, the greater their obligations in terms of taking steps to ensure efficient functioning of the system of planning and monitoring task performance.

7045
CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

MILOVAN DJILAS DISCUSSES EUROPEAN SITUATION ON EVE OF BELGRADE CONFERENCE

Bonn DIE WELT in German 21/22 May 77 p 1 (of Welt Report section)

[Text] Milovan Djilas, author of the following analysis of East-West relations, has always been a man of many surprises and unconventional ideas. At a time when the West was inclined to play down Soviet policies, the former deputy of Marshal Tito and present dissident made the headlines by his dramatic warnings of dangerous Soviet intentions. Now, when the euphoria of detente is dying down in the West and many even expect new confrontations between East and West, Milovan Djilas talks of an imminent and prolonged period of peace and a competition, a debate of philosophers, which will replace the earlier cold war.

One might term this kind of thinking "contrapuntal." It responds to the nature and the origins of this man who, once upon a time, was one of the great revolutionaries and partisans of Yugoslavia and his homeland Montenegro. Before the term "dissident" was in use Milovan Djilas was in fact the first of this breed: In 1954 when, from deeply held conviction, he gave up political power and the glitter of high office, accepted vilification and persecution, and was sent to jail for 9 years by his former political friends.

Djilas way of thinking has not been deflected by these experiences. He continued criticizing the Yugoslav communists while, at the same time, approving Belgrade's policy of independence and nonalignment. He contradicted Tito--though never disputing his standing in history--without a thought of what the latter had done to him in the years of his imprisonment.

The history of his homeland serves best to explain the attitude of this man who now lives in retirement in Belgrade: There we find the "neither-nor," the search for the independent way between the giants and powers surrounding the individual. Milovan Djilas, the partisan who became a statesman,

the functionary who became a philosopher, somehow looks at West and East in profile. When he abandoned communism as an ideology he did more than change sides; he took up an independent position. That is what makes Djilas fascinating--and it elevates his essay well above the ordinary and everyday political debate. The one who writes here knows the meaning of history and fate.

It is an accepted fact now that the "cold war" is a thing of the past. Churchill's warning prophesy was not fulfilled: Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has not sown the seed of World War III. At the same time Lenin's sermon on the inevitability of a "final settlement" between "capitalism" and "socialism" has turned out to be even more of a deception or self-deception. In our nuclear age relations between the countries of the world, and especially of Europe, are not developing in accordance with the classic formulas of state and class interests; equally involved is the clash of civilizations and philosophies. It is therefore important for everyone to appreciate the special features of such a development.

The objective causes of the "cold war" were the antagonisms between the two leading powers--the USSR and the United States--although it was usually represented as the conflict between "capitalism" and "socialism" or between democracy and totalitarianism. It is certain that even these real causes are, at least in part, derived from exaggerated fears, the ambitions of the leaders and the prevailing doctrines. Yet any attempt to establish who is "guilty" or acts from "selfish" motives would merely deflect us from considering the real issue, that is the current prospects of East-West relations.

The "cold war" has receded now--except in the heads of those who consider it the reflection of the "eternal" clash between good and evil. It is therefore possible to undertake a more definitive study of the ruins it left behind, the deceptions and self-deception.

Capitalist Property Neither Holy nor Stable

The internal conditions, the strengths as well as the weaknesses, of the two leading powers--the United States and the USSR--have been laid bare. It is now quite impossible to describe these relations and developments within "capitalism" and "socialism" in an one-sided and biased manner or in the shape of an opportunist, abstract and "fair" symmetry somewhat along the lines of "not everything is good in either of the two worlds; each one has its advantages and disadvantages." An analysis must be factual, properly considered and truthful to the very end--as if no "cold war" nor the "real causes" of rivalry had ever existed. A one-sided appraisal and the attempt at obtaining "fair" symmetry would rob us of the creative possibilities and make us mere spectators of the fate of mankind--a fate which, after all, is in this day and age the same for all nations and each individual. My conclusions presented in the following are possibly too summary to do justice to the demands I am making on others: This is primarily due to my "poetical"

mode of thought, less to the limits imposed by the length of this article. What I mean to stress, and what in my opinion is nowadays quite evident, is the fact that the systems prevailing in the West are not so bad nor those in the East so good as claimed by ideological doctrinaires and those who manipulate these ideologies.

"Capitalism" certainly is nothing like its descriptions, nor, incidentally, does it resemble the representation of its own politicians and apologists. It is neither the ideal form of society nor the best possible. It may well be that the significance of the Western democracies and the extent to which they offer the ideal rests in the fact that they deny their own perfection. By doing so the Western democracies acquire for themselves the possibility of embarking on intellectual and social critiques.

In short: The Western democracies have demonstrated a vitality and adaptability transcending anything the large corporations, the imperialists nor even the capitalist class itself were adequate, suitable or capable of. The social systems of the West are in a phase of ferment and movement. What road are they taking and where are they going? Nobody can answer this question with absolute certainty. But doubtless the West is moving toward even greater abundance and even more "immoral" and less inhibited lifestyles. All those who predicted the rise of dictatorships of the left or right, were deceived. Capitalism as described by the socialist theoreticians of the 19th Century still exists in the form of the right to capitalist property. But this property itself is no longer the same: It is neither holy nor stable. And the imperialism of the adventurers and profiteers is a mere hangover from the "good old times." Most obvious are the West's efforts to achieve free trade and maintain strategic bases. On the other hand the West has ceased its efforts to remake the world in its own image, just as it rejected in its own society any "perfect" and final solution. In view of its fundamentally humanist qualities the West now is immeasurably closer than the East to the classic--or Marxist, if you wish to call it so--socialist doctrine.

Eastern bureaucratic "socialism" is inferior to democratic capitalism in every respect. I have never before said this quite so bluntly because I believe that such a comparison of the realities in both social system tends to be too schematic. I am saying it now so that there may not be any doubt as to my convictions and also to affirm my complete agreement with similar ideas proposed by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski.

Maybe there was some hope at one stage--even if only among revolutionaries and the poor--that it would not be like that. But those times are past. And something else needs saying: Truth and criticism, even if camouflaged by the word "constructive," will certainly find neither understanding nor amiability among the ideological policemen and the police ideologists.

Neither in my case nor in that of Kolakowski or any other independent critic in the East does such an affirmation and such a comparison signify that we

have simply opted for the West. For us the West is not a model and certainly not an ideal. The West to us signifies humane and humanist support in a long lasting, usually hopeless and always selfless struggle for intellectual freedom. The West has enabled us to expand our intellectual--and sometimes our physical--life. The mere fact that the West did not aim to subject our opinions and actions to any check has strengthened our conviction that those are doomed to extinction, who strive to regiment the lifestyle of other people.

Just as it would be catastrophic for the West to accept the "wisdom" of the Messianic prophets of the East, it would be idiotic for the East to ape Western models. When we talk of the West's superiority we do not mean to copy it but to reprimand our "Eastern" doctrinaire tyrannies which use the deformation of knowledge and consciousness to secure their monopoly status and prevent the spontaneous development of contacts between East and West, North and South. People who insist that their world is the best actually enslave this world and threaten others.

Eastern Europe's Party Bureaucracy Manipulates the Masses

The prospect of a long period of peaceful competition makes it necessary for us to conduct a more complex study and accept a more profound responsibility. Truth in freedom, that is an honest analysis of society and an undogmatic description of the life of men--this appears to me the most effective and reasonable method. I do not mean to say that this method has not been used before. On the contrary: Precisely this method has always been most fruitful.

In my opinion it is the method which, in the period we are now entering, is best suited to be the predominant if not the only one to be used. Truth unalloyed--truth which does not claim absolute validity, truth which is the sanctified principle of objective research: It is this which, in contrast to the doctrinaire and insane methods of the cold war period responds to the current age of detente and confrontation. In the light of such an analysis and such a description the system in Eastern Europe will certainly appear in a different light--literally different, that means worse in some respects and better in others than depicted by their neomanichaeen or unbalanced opponents.

This leads me again briefly and generally to say something about the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, but with this warning: Mine also is a provisional verdict without any claim to conclusiveness (because it is altogether impossible to arrive at a final conclusion even about "dead" matter, let alone something as alive as a human society).

So: The societies in Eastern Europe are already differentiated and in some respect pluralist. But the ideology stagnates and, in some cases is actually moribund. And yet this ideology is still in use as a ritual practice and ritual obligation. By this means the authoritarian political system,

the monopolistic power and the party bureaucracy are still able effectively to manipulate the masses and stifle any initiative from the direction of undogmatic and other dissident elements.

This is easy for the rulers--not only because they hold a monopoly of power but also because modern technology enables them to satisfy the fundamental material (not to say biological) needs of man. Even in these countries it is possible to live and survive--in a limited and crippled shape: Those people who have their own thoughts or wish to be creative in their own way, are immediately condemned to either revolt or the acceptance of painful restrictions. People in the East can live and survive but in a manner far below the potential offered by intellectual and political freedom. It is not the case that in these countries devils rule saints. Actually ordinary people (with all their faults) are ruled by people who exploit their power as the source of all kinds of privileges for themselves. That is why they identify themselves and their class with the people and the state and manipulate ideology as well as mythical revolutionary and national values.

Nobody can say with any certainty how long this state of affairs will continue. But anyone who devotes even minimal attention to the "reforms" practiced in every East European country, will be able to persuade himself that the attempts at "consolidation" on the basis of the present ideology and the current political system are idle--despite the fragmentation of the opposition. The inefficiency of the system is incurable, for the simple reason that this inefficiency is an essential element of the system per se. Internal developments and external "models"--the democratic changes in the West and, especially, the ferment gripping the European communist parties--are already so irresistible and plainly visible that the party monopolists are compelled to be careful when using their power and repressive methods, although they have an abundance of the former and incomparably extensive experience of the latter.

The Kremlin the Most Rigid Power in the World

Circumstances differ from country to country, although one-party government and the trend toward standardized "socialist" property are common to all East European countries. I also want to emphasize that the Soviet Union is the most conservative and least adaptable power in the East if not in the world. That is mainly due to the closed nature of Soviet society and the imperialist pretensions of the Soviet party bureaucracy.

Precisely the differences between the countries of Eastern Europe underline the need for analysis and description by the fairest and most accurate methods. The nature of these methods and their necessity do not, though, exclude the daily reaction (determined by truthfulness) to events. Indeed they make it even more necessary. Moreover: Such a reaction is the prerequisite and integrating element of these methods. Politics are life, if not in its totality then at least in its most fateful moments.

All this appears plainer and more necessary if we take into consideration the disintegration of the power blocs and the blurring of the sharp divisions between them (Yugoslavia and Romania's "heresies" in the East, France's "independent line" and Greece's "retreat" in the West).

Maybe it is more than ever up to philosophers and artists to be involved in the fate of Europe and the world. It seems as if in place of a horrific image our eyes are now offered merely a grotesque: A battle, a war of philosophers replacing the insane fancies of the cold war.

11698

CSO: 2300

GENERAL LJUBICIC VIEWS SHAPE OF FUTURE WARFARE

Belgrade MORNARICKI GLASNIK in Serbo-Croatian No 1, Jan-Feb 77 pp 9-16

[Article by Army General Nikole Ljubicic excerpted from his book "Opstena narodna odbrana strategija mira" (Nationwide Defense: A Peace Strategy): "The Physiognomy of Future War"]

[Text] It can be stated with confidence that every future war will differ in many respects from the previous one or from any other war which might be waged at the same time in another region of the world. This depends, and it will depend more and more, on a variety of factors such as space, the capability of the belligerents and the level of their materiel and equipment, and the art of waging war. However, it is certain that each of these factors will vary both qualitatively and quantitatively from time to time and from space to space.

The military equipment that is now known and has already been used on a large scale, and also the weapons which have yet to appear, will greatly influence the aggressor's aims and desires. At one time, for example, the pace of the attack, the type of maneuver and troop concentration depended exclusively on the capabilities of foot soldiers, animal-drawn vehicles and cavalry. Since the motor has made its appearance and since vehicles have been refined, not only has the speed increased, but there have also been changes in the content, scope and character of military engagements. Even in World War II it was armored units supported by air power which set the pace of an attack, while the infantry's role was considerably diminished. To a certain extent the infantry reaffirmed itself in the war in the Near East, and we can expect the motorized infantry and armored units will set the pace of contemporary actions by ground forces.

The development of vessels made it possible to expand operations to all the oceans, and the emergence of aircraft 50 years ago and missiles 30 years ago has led to the creation of altogether new branches of the armed forces. It is therefore natural that theaters of war, viewed from the standpoint of technical possibilities, may automatically expand and might extend over continents and the entire world. Such are the capabilities of the weapons possessed today by military powers that they must have an impact on political appetites and the shaping of military strategies.

Until recently no one imagined that personnel and materiel could be concentrated so rapidly as they can today. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war this was done in the most up-to-date way by rapidly establishing effective "airlifts" to the zone of operations; this was moreover done from very great distances, from other continents. This put the world on notice that when a local war breaks out equipment which allows for rapid arrival and concentration of troops can be used to a maximum in order to achieve surprise and superiority and to confront the country attacked and the entire world with a *fait accompli*. The strategy of the "*fait accompli*" and of so-called preventive warfare is being built and developed on those capabilities.

The art of war, especially tactics, has always depended greatly on weapons. This will still be the case in the future as they undergo further development and refinement. For example, the conventional aircraft led to the construction of airfields, while the helicopter and the aircraft which takes off vertically can altogether eliminate that need. This will make for greater dispersion, air power will thereby be more secure, and different tactical procedures will be the result.

If the advent of cold weapons [that is, as opposed to firearms--translator's note] heralded close combat, when the rifle, the first firearm, appeared, the opponents stepped back from one another, and combat was waged from a more secure distance. This had an impact on the shaping and depth of orders of battle and also on other procedures. The arrival of the cannon on the battlefield with its great range and destructive power led to positional defense and the waging of combat from fortresses.

The range of even the longest-range artillery was exceeded when the airplane made its appearance, and the front could be hit throughout its depth, as could a good portion (or all) of the territory of the belligerents. Though air power has improved steadily, the radius of its action is nevertheless limited, and therefore the demands of strategy could not be satisfied. That is why rocket engineering made its appearance. This did not diminish the role of air power, but represented its "extended arm": capabilities (range and striking power) which were already great were augmented by a new projectile carrier whose capabilities are almost unlimited. Intercontinental missiles can strike any part of the world with nuclear warheads from any point on the earth. A critical moment was reached: the world was threatened with self-destruction because of the unlimited range of these weapons. For the first time in history the advance of engineering and technology (development of missile systems) threatened man's survival. The age-old race in the conquest of space and distance, on the one hand, and in increasing destructive power of explosives on the other reached its end point with this practically unlimited range and with the advent of nuclear power. Until nuclear missile weapons were invented, these two were in inverse proportion to one another, but with the advent of nuclear missiles this contradiction vanishes for all practical purposes. At the moment when the territories of the two superpowers became directly and completely vulnerable, it became evident that a direct conflict between them could not bring anything else but destruction of both sides.

However, though all of this made it objectively impossible for a general nuclear war to break out, it did not extinguish the desire to win prestige and to conquer new positions. Nuclear power was immediately given another role, the role of guarantor of each side's own security, while all the other means of waging war became implements for achieving prestige through indirect confrontation. This has had a great many consequences.

Acquisitive powers have always striven to have the front or area of possible military action as far as possible from their national territories. They have managed to do this because the range of weapons has been increasing. However, at the moment when that range became so to speak unlimited, so that their territories were also threatened, in their own interest they tacitly renounced the use of those weapons for all practical purposes and endeavored as in the past to keep any possible local front as far as possible from their borders. That accounts for the increased importance of short-range combat (what is called close combat), just as it once diminished as the range of weapons increased.

In view of the destructive power of contemporary weapons, an effort is made to avoid a worldwide (nuclear or even conventional) military conflict. However, even should there be no world wars, this does not mean that war will not be waged at all. Indeed there is an increased danger that local wars will break out. They could draw in a large number of small countries. All of this taken together has brought about other changes:

First, countries which are bent on conquest are replacing or supplementing their previous conception of direct strategy with an indirect strategy or at least a more dynamic strategic maneuver, which is well known by the name of the strategy of indirect advance.

Second, because of uncertainty as to development of the situation there probably will be no decrease in total military expenditures, but funds earmarked for production of arms and necessary for a direct strike will be transferred to improvement of weapons for the waging of indirect and local warfare. This means that possible victims of aggression will also have to increase the funds they set aside for defense in proportion to the increased danger that local conflicts will break out. From the socioeconomic standpoint, this amounts to out-and-out exhaustion of the small and underdeveloped and already impoverished countries and peoples.

Third, imperialist circles in the world who are bent on conquest have created conditions for adaptation of their armed forces or only of some parts of them to the conditions under which local wars are waged, having shifted the emphasis to this type of war. Small professional armies with up-to-date equipment and superb training are better suited to this purpose. Yet the possible victims of aggression are unable in most cases to create armies of this kind, and opt instead for preparing their entire people for defense. Thus local wars will actually be conflicts between professional armies and peoples who oppose aggression with total resistance.

Fourth, since the economically and financially strong countries have the most highly developed arms industries, war being its best consumer, they will be trying to sell their arms in as many countries as possible. They will do this not only to make profit, but also to make those countries economically, militarily and politically dependent upon them. Though this kind of supply of war materiel may seem acceptable at first, it is fraught with many hazards, beginning with blackmail and ending with refusal to deliver arms and equipment, especially ammunition and spare parts, at the most critical moments. Past experience teaches that dangers of this kind can be avoided by relying primarily on one's own suppliers and on friendly countries.

From the standpoint of its objective, a local war may be more or less radical or indeed quite limited. It may encompass the space of one or more countries, and several countries may feed upon it indirectly. Under certain circumstances it is not impossible that so-called refined or small nuclear weapons might be used in local warfare; some of the great nuclear powers have been assiduously developing and improving these weapons. As to the use of weapons, then, the local wars need not necessarily be conventional, but may also be nuclear.

An aggressor will always strive to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible and--by sudden, powerful and rapid actions--to achieve his objective in the war at the earliest moment and to present his victim and world public opinion with a fait accompli. However, should he fail in this, he will not necessarily give up pursuit of his goal until he is compelled by the defender's steadfast and exhaustive actions.

We know from experience that an aggressor is most effectively compelled to renounce a military adventure by the resolute determination of the threatened countries to resist him. This does not mean that one should not accept aid, and not merely material aid, depending on the conditions and needs.

Since time immemorial the larger and stronger have attacked the smaller and weaker in order to subjugate them and put them at the service of their own interests. In the future as in the past the weaker will never threaten anyone unless they are someone's satellites, but will only be defending themselves. If one must assert himself against a stronger adversary, he will be wise to find the appropriate mode of defense and the appropriate doctrine and strategy of defensive warfare.

The commencement and course of military actions will be different in each individual case and will depend on many circumstances. Among other things, no aggressor ever repeats himself. He is continuously improving his weapons and combat procedures and is always striving to achieve surprise. That is why the participants in a conflict always strive to get the fullest possible intelligence about one another, since preparations for war and a war's development and outcome depend greatly on how well informed one is.

Everything which seems possible and probable today, may indeed be unacceptable tomorrow. That makes the development of science and technology an increasingly important task. After all, no country can afford to leave itself open to surprise. Everything that is implied by the term "timely intelligence about an adversary" and by "protection" must be foreseen and done if one is to outwit a potential conqueror and overpower him, that is, if one is to win. Otherwise the waging of war will be more difficult, the losses will be greater, and victory will be less certain.

Bearing in mind the complexity of events and of the danger of war in the world, and there will continue to be wars in the future, we must emphasize that regardless of the equipment and armament of an aggressor's troops and of the refinement of old weapon systems and the discovery of new ones, one must not lose self-confidence and faith in his own abilities and capacities, since under all conditions a way can be found to effectively defend the country, and this is a truth that has been confirmed countless times in history. In World War II the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves proved it, and their experience has been confirmed by many other peoples who have subsequently, under very difficult conditions, waged liberation and revolutionary and defensive wars on their own territory. If this has been proven in both the remote and the recent past, it is logical for us to ask why it cannot be confirmed once again should the need arise?

National strategies are shaped in line with development of the balance of power and the technical and technological factor. There are changes in ways of achieving the strategic goals of war, be they aggressive or defensive; those goals will vary greatly and will depend on numerous circumstances both external and internal. The development of the strategies of the blocs and the revolutionary-liberation movements in the last quarter of a century has stimulated reflections about their future evolution. If, say, NATO has changed two strategic doctrines and several strategic conceptions in a period of 20 years, the question arises as to what direction that development will take in the future? On the whole every strategy in the future will be based on global and partial (limited) goals. To achieve the limited goals there always have been and will be modified strategies and corresponding plans and forces. The designers and practitioners of these strategies have always striven particularly to find a "plausible" pretext for each action they take and to prevent the adversary from preparing for defense as completely as possible; this will continue to be true in the future. So various "plans for case x" are devised, and theoretical work is done on the political and practical aspects of using nuclear and conventional weapons in general and especially in local warfare. This gave rise to the idea of using a "warning shot" until a political arrangement is devised as the basis for halting the aggression and also to the idea of the gradual use of nuclear weapons, beginning with the smallest weapons and building up to selective use of various nuclear weapons, i.e., action only against military objectives.

Along with the bloc strategies, liberation and revolutionary movements have also created and developed strategies aimed at liberating their peoples from occupation or colonial enslavement. As for the balance of power, every liberation movement, taken individually, would be weaker than the mother country in military power and in general. But every mother country has been in an inferior position with respect to all the national movements taken together, each of them fighting for liberation in its own space. So the advantage in general and in the individual balance of power, except for equipment, has by and large been on the side of the liberation movements. Under these conditions each movement has chosen the strategy which would lead it most speedily and reliably to victory.

Numerous strategies have developed in the course of the process of liberation and the taking of power, beginning with the strategy of "peace marches" (India) and "arms liberation" (Vietnam, Algeria, etc.) to the "strategy of attrition." Certain small countries have managed to expel the colonists and to achieve strategic goals by pursuing these strategies. The examples of Cuba and Cyprus are exceptionally instructive in this regard. For example, the Cypriot guerrillas never set themselves the goal of ejecting the colonial troops with firepower, since this would have been unrealistic, but the members of the guerrillas were convinced that their daily actions would make life miserable for the occupiers so that they themselves would conclude that it was nonsensical and impossible for them to stay any longer on the island. And in this they were not mistaken. So the guerrillas achieved their strategic goal of liberating their own country.

In other countries power has been taken in other ways, including parliamentary elections, but never has it been taken by a strategy of individual terror.

Most of the former colonial countries in the world have won the fight for power and are now consolidating the defense of their independence against internal reaction and external interventionists, and they have adapted their defensive strategies accordingly. We can therefore understand quite well that in the future refinement of those strategies the emphasis will be on defending the achievements of the revolution and their own independence.

The great powers, which have an advanced industry, have decided to safeguard their own power and prestige by improving nuclear weapons. The underdeveloped countries, especially the small ones and some of the medium-sized ones, have never been able to follow them in this. But this is not meant, nor does it now, that those who are unable to have an atomic bomb cannot find and possess other suitable means of response: some their own special invention, weapon or method of deterring an aggressor in accordance with their own conditions and capabilities.

In the case of Yugoslavia this capability lies in the conception of nationwide defense. By applying this conception in the National Liberation War Yugoslavia won its victory, freedom and independence under very unfavorable

conditions. Relying on its own capabilities and on its refined strategy, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has managed to preserve those achievements and to ensure the secure development of self-management socialism. Today, when those who are more powerful present a threat, Yugoslavia does not seek salvation in external and nuclear protection, but in an updated conception of nationwide defense in which man is the principal force, since he is determined, ready and capable of deterring an aggressor, that is, of effectively beating him if he attacks Yugoslavia.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has accordingly devised and refined its own means and method of deterring an invader and its own strategy for waging defensive warfare. Their effectiveness will be enhanced if every man in Yugoslavia has a clear knowledge of how he will fight and what he will be fighting for. All of Yugoslav society is making the appropriate effort in that direction and is trying through the organized system of nationwide defense, which is constantly being improved, to achieve the kind of defensive power and defensive strategy which will guarantee Yugoslavia's superiority over all who might threaten its freedom and independence.

Yugoslavia's strategy of nationwide defense threatens no one; it is an anti-war strategy, and it serves the cause of peace.

We Yugoslavs are convinced that we are invincible thanks to our strategy, since Yugoslav strategy is based on the total strength of the Yugoslav community. Yugoslavia will always strive to deter aggressors and to ensure its own peaceful construction so that its citizens will have a better life. That is why the Yugoslav strategy of nationwide defensive warfare is actually a peace strategy.

7045
CS0: 2800

END